Opportunism and the limits of blockchain as urban land governance: a comparative transaction-cost analysis
Abstract
Blockchain is frequently proposed as a solution to tenure insecurity, administrative inefficiencies, and
corruption, where conventional land reforms have fallen short. However, evidence of its institutional
effectiveness remains limited. Drawing on Williamsonian transaction cost economics and an analytical
autoethnographic research design, we undertake a comparative analysis of blockchain’s ability to curb
opportunism and safeguard the interests of land-transacting parties relative to Ghana’s customary and
statutory land-governance structures. Our findings show that while blockchain performs well at some ex
ante safeguards, it offers no clear advantage over existing governance structures at the ex post stage. Of the
seven identified forms of post-transaction opportunism that buyers often face, blockchain was superior
only in minimising hold-up risks. We conclude with implications for policymakers and technologists
considering blockchain adoption.
Details
- Organisationseinheit(en)
-
Geodätisches Institut
- Externe Organisation(en)
-
University of Melbourne
Technische Universität München (TUM)
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
- Typ
- Artikel
- Journal
- Journal of Institutional Economics
- Band
- 22
- ISSN
- 1744-1374
- Publikationsdatum
- 22.06.2026
- Publikationsstatus
- Veröffentlicht
- Peer-reviewed
- Ja
- ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete
- Allgemeine Ökonomie, Ökonometrik und Finanzen
- Ziele für nachhaltige Entwicklung
- SDG 2 - Kein Hunger, SDG 11 - Nachhaltige Städte und Gemeinschaften
- Elektronische Version(en)
-
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137426100605 (Zugang:
Offen
)
